NYLS Journal of International and
Comparative Law
Volume 17
Number 1 SYMPOSIUM: IMPLICATIONS OF THE
RECONSTRUCTION OF LLOYD'S OF LONDON

Article 2

1997

SYMPOSIUM: IMPLICATIONS OF THE RECONSTRUCTION OF
LLOYD'S OF LONDON

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/
journal_of_international_and_comparative_law
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
(1997) "SYMPOSIUM: IMPLICATIONS OF THE RECONSTRUCTION OF LLOYD'S OF LONDON," NYLS Journal
of International and Comparative Law: Vol. 17 : No. 1 , Article 2.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/journal_of_international_and_comparative_law/vol17/iss1/
2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for
inclusion in NYLS Journal of International and Comparative Law by an authorized editor of
DigitalCommons@NYLS.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL CENTER FOR
INTERNATIONAL LAW SYMPOSIUM
Implications of the
Reconstruction of Lloyd's of London
DEAN WELLINGTON: Welcome to New York Law School and to this
symposium, which promises to be a rare treat. This is the first conference
that our new Center for International Law has sponsored in conjunction
with our old and venerable Journalof Internationaland ComparativeLaw.
The Center has an extraordinary director, someone whom I have known
for a very long time. It also has a distinguished board of advisors, and the
Chairman of the board of advisors, Lewis Glucksman, is here to support
US.
The Starr Foundation created a chair in the law of international trade
and finance, and it gave us some seed money for this center. When we got
the grant, I knew the person I wanted to be its director. When I started
teaching law, he was in the class I began with. I think he also helped edit
one of the first articles I published. He was based in the Paris office when
I began thinking about filling the chair and the directorship, and when he
happened to be in New York we had lunch. I subsequently learned that
he thought that maybe this would be a good job for him. I certainly had
him in mind for the position.
Sydney M. Cone, III, known far and wide as Terry, is a great and
distinguished international lawyer who has spent many years primarily in
the practice of international finance at Cleary, Gottlieb where he has been
a partner. Terry has been in the Paris and Brussels offices of Cleary,
Gottlieb. He has also been instrumental in setting up offices around the
world and in bringing the Russian Government to Cleary, Gottlieb as a
client. He is also a scholar. This year, he produced a book entitled The
International Trade in Legal Services. It is published by Little, Brown and
it is a joy to read. I urge it on all of you. It is funny and it is very
informative. Terry is an extraordinary addition to this institution, and I
would now like to introduce him to you.
PROF. CONE: Thank you very much Harry. I do appreciate the
introduction. This symposium is about the implications of the
reconstruction of Lloyd's of London. A major subject because the
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reconstruction of Lloyd's of London is a phenomenal event. It has as a
background, years of difficulty, years of litigation, years that would be
consumed with problems relating to toxic torts, to mass torts, to the
organization of the insurance industry. It is really one of the epochal
events of our time and one of the singular successes of this year. One is
always tempted to call such a phenomenon unique, and today, the day after
Election Day, I feet safe in saying that it is unique in one respect. It is one
success for which none of the candidates claims credit.
We are extremely fortunate to have the speakers who are here today
to deal with the implications of the reconstruction of Lloyd's of London.
We have Edward Muhl, the New York Superintendent of Insurance,
Nicholas Prettejohn, the Head of Strategy of Lloyd's of London,1 Sean
Mooney of the Insurance Information Institute, and Christian Milton of
American International Group. Our first speaker is Edward Muhl, the New
York Superintendent of Insurance. It is a great honor for this law school
that he has agreed to come here to be with us. I give you Mr. Muhl.
MR. MUHL: Thank you very much, Professor Cone. Ladies and
gentlemen, it is a delight to be here for a number of reasons. It is also
really special to be here to participate in this symposium with this
distinguished panel that we have. Professor Cone had indicated that this
symposium, the implications of the reconstruction of Lloyd's of London,
is intended to be forward looking and is less concerned with the events of
the past. But I feel compelled to describe briefly some of the past events
in order to discuss, what I believe, to be some of the important lessons
going forward, particularly some of the implications of the reconstruction
from a regulator's view.
Let me first set the stage, if I may. Picture this if you will, it is early
January 1995. My very first day in the insurance department as the
Superintendent of Insurance for the State of New York. I called all of my
senior management team together at the time. I introduced myself to them
and then I asked each for a very full briefing of anything that was pending
before the department, anything of significance or importance, anything of
controversy they needed to tell me about. Later that morning I was handed
a report and it was the department's review of the adequacy of the Lloyd's
of London U.S. trust fund. Along with this report was an order that the
insurance department counsel had put together. If I had signed that order,
it would have de-accredited Lloyd's of London as an accredited reinsurer

1. Mr. Prettejohn is currently the Managing Director of the Business Development Unit
at Lloyd's of London.
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and an accredited excess and surplus lines rendered in New York, basically
for their failure to maintain adequate monies in trust.
After reading the report, and it was a relatively large report, I called
the governor and asked him who was his second choice for my job,
because I was about to demand a recount. New York is basically a port of
entry of Lloyd's for the United States because we oversee all the U.S.
trusts. We also control its status as an eligible writer in the United States
market as well as in the excess and surplus lines. I asked my senior
management if they realized what would happen if I signed the order. The
general answer was very simply that Lloyd's would be de-accredited. I
responded by saying, "If I sign this order, the insurance world as we know
it would change."
I then asked my staff how many New York license companies had the
bulk of their reinsurance recoverables through Lloyd's, and how many
countrywide. The answer was that New York had fifty-one companies and
countrywide we figured about 300 companies. So if I sign that order,
Lloyd's and its reconstruction effort at the time would have failed and we
would have fifty-one insolvent New York insurance companies and, at a
All U.S. major airports,
minimum, 300 insolvencies countrywide.
including the likes of Kennedy, Newark and La Guardia, would have no
coverage or recoverables because they insured directly in the E and S
market through Lloyd's. Furthermore, the New York Port Authority and
the Long Island Railroad would be without recoverables and insurance on
the direct basis due to a possible lack of capacity in this industry if Lloyd's
were to fail. This had the potential to be the most cataclysmic event that
the insurance world had ever seen. And all of this on my first day on the
job. My timing, I would suggest, was absolutely unbelievable. We e ut
to find a solution to this monumental problem because we did not like the
alternatives. If we were to pull the plug, capacity would dry up for at least
two years, prices would skyrocket across the board, and how do you deal
with 300 insolvencies of primary insurers all at the same time? Our
primary responsibility, however, was to protect U.S. policyholders'
interest. Lloyd's American Trust Funds are there because New York State
Insurance Department requires Lloyd's to put up in each of these trusts
$100 million for the excess and surplus lines, and another $100 million for
reinsurance. In addition, we require Lloyd's to put up dollar-for-dollar on
all U.S. liabilities on a gross basis whatever they insure. We examined the
trust and found $13 billion to be in trust. That is a little bit shy of what
they were supposed to have at the time, shy by about $7 billion net. I
elected to immediately stop the bleeding by requiring Lloyd's to create two
new trusts and to fully fund these trusts on a dollar-for-dollar gross basis
on all U.S. business written from that point forward. So we were able to

N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 17

stop the problem from escalating. We then set out to deal with the
problems of the past.
We worked with Lloyd's on their new company, later called the
Equitas project, which was simply a mechanism to marshal assets and to
pay claims of policyholders, including U.S. policyholders. As the
domiciliary regulator of LATF, Lloyd's American Trust Fund, the New
York Insurance Department was required to approve any transfer of funds
from LATF to fund Equitas. We wanted to achieve several objectives. The
primary one, as I mentioned before, was to protect U.S. policyholders'
interest. Another objective was to represent the other forty nine state
regulators in this effort. Yet another objective was to make the Equitas
project work.
The negotiations we entered into were very intense and at times were
quite sensitive. These negotiations literally came down to within minutes
to midnight London time on the day that the deadline was set. We had
open phone lines to Lloyd's, to the Department of Trade and Industry
("DTI"), to several U.S. and British law firms, and to Citibank as trustee
of the Lloyd's U.S. trust. Prior to approving the partial transfer of monies,
we required the incorporation of a number of safeguards, including an
additional $1.2 billion, basically $800 million in cash and $400 million
collateralized guarantees, to be contributed to the Equitas trust to support
solely U.S. dollar denominated liabilities. We are very proud of the work
that we did and it was a gratifying experience to work closely with the
British regulators at the DTI, Lloyd's, the Equitas officials, particularly
David Rowland, Lloyd's chairman, the Federal authorities, and the
representatives of the Canadian government. Our efforts resulted in the
reconstruction effort going forward with what we believe is a stronger
Lloyd's of London-well positioned to compete both in the worldwide
reinsurance market as well as in the surplus lines markets. The Equitas
project itself, although not perfect, represents the best solution to a
difficult process. Equitas, in my opinion, is the best chance for U.S.
policyholders to receive full payment on all of their claim activity.
But there are lessons to be learned from these extraordinary events.
In fashioning answers to difficult problems we kept asking ourselves, how
did these problems escalate to the point where we were at the brink of a
serious solvency issue? How did Lloyd's basically fall prey to these
difficulties? In hindsight we find that it was a combination of several
significant factors.
Not the least of which was complacency, and
incompetence in some cases. Then there was retro-liability involving
asbestos and environmental claims in the United States and natural
disasters such as Hurricanes Andrew and Hugo and the Northridge quake.
These were coupled with the losses at Piper Alfa and the Valdez oil spill.
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Finally, there was the reinsurance ceeding amongst themselves without
adequate information and without knowing that the Names were
reinsurancing themselves in many instances.
One of the most significant issues revealed to our staff during the
investigative review process was a problem with the process that actually
made Lloyd's so unique in the first instance. This was their usual but
actually unusual accounting process, or maybe I should say their lack of
accounting. In fact, some of the syndicates actually did not know what
their exposures were. We must remember that Lloyd's has a long and
proud history. It is an institution steeped in its origins and its traditions.
An underwriter in the 17th or 18th century would be very comfortable with
Lloyd's in the 1990s because not much had changed over that period. But
insurance and reinsurance transactions have become substantial and
complex and require a greater degree of sophistication in monitoring, in
measuring, and in general information processing. Many of the Lloyd's
syndicates lack the sophistication which resulted in the escalation of many
of their problems. Fortunately, Lloyd's has now come into the modem
age and is now using computers. The New York Insurance Department is
also requiring Lloyd's to file individual quarterly and annual financial
statements for every syndicate writing either reinsurance or excess in
surplus lines. We are requiring separate trust funds for each syndicate
writing U.S. risks. We are also requiring syndicates to separate their
reinsurance business from their excess lines business and to file statements
reflecting their experience in each market.
These requirements have added a crucial element of accountability and
transparency that was missing in the past. It is important to create a system
of checks and balances to determine whether the process is working as
intended. It is also important for the underwriters to use all of their skills
in assessing the risk exposure and pricing it properly. They cannot afford
to use unskilled or ill-prepared individuals in this very critical role. The
management has a responsibility to test the system to determine compliance
with policy and good insurance practice and not become complacent with
process or tradition. It is important for Lloyd's and Lloyd's syndicates,
particularly for their credibility, to make their accounting systems even
more transparent. We believe that it is important for Lloyd's to abandon
their traditional three-year accounting in favor of a one-year approach.
Such a move will make it easier for customers, investors, analysts and
regulators to assess the financial strengths and weaknesses of the
organization. Their problems can be identified earlier and hopefully the
misdeeds of the past will not be recreated.
Lloyd's has over the years prided itself on being self-regulated. The
DTI conducts solvency tests and provides some overall regulation through
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a very talented and very dedicated staff. The DTI, though, does not
examine Lloyd's itself or its syndicates, and this has the potential of
creating a very large credibility problem. Personally I am not an advocate
of over-regulation because there are significant dangers to the market that
are associated with over-regulation as there are with under-regulation.
Balance is very important, but I sense that no one, including the British
govermment, wishes to go through this maze a second time. I betieve that
if the system of self-regulation were to continue, there should at least be
a limited review and compliance oversight through Lloyd's, but by an
independent, reporting to Lloyd's. The system of testing, if you will,
gives management yet another view in order to avoid the mistakes of the
past.
The new Lloyd's is now positioned for significant market rebound in
my opinion, and its importance to the U.S. market and its significance to
the world of insurance generally is quite great. I have come to understand
how small our world really is because we are dealing in a global insurance
marketplace and there is an absolute interdependence of the players within
that market. Professor Cone, I will be more than pleased to answer
questions.
SPEAKER: Could you clarify your position on Lloyd's self-regulation as
opposed to overregulation?
MR. MUHL: Well, I believe that they need to become a bit more
transparent than they are. The self-regulation has served them to the degree
that it has over these years. I understand their desire to continue with selfregulation, but I believe that there ought to be, if there is going to be a
continuation of self-regulation, some outside audit review. This would in
fact aid Lloyd's to review itself and then to report back to management
their findings that maintains the degree of self-regulation. But it also adds
an element of outside review that could aid and assist them to avoid the
problems that they have experienced in the past.
SPEAKER: What kind of outside review?
MR. MUHL: Independent audit review taking the form from CPA audits
to insurance audits, but done through the Lloyd's system.
SPEAKER: So it would still be internal?
MR. MUHL:
continues.

Essentially internal. That is assuming that self-regulation

19971

LLOYD'S OF LONDON

SPEAKER: Do you think that they should have outside regulation?
MR. MUHL: As I have indicated, I have mixed emotions about it. I am
concerned that if you have overregulation that you can cause trauma to a
very delicate market system and you really do not want to do that. I
believe they need to do something more than they have done in the past.
But to open it up to overregulation, possibly more onerous regulation,
would not do any good for the marketplace itself. There has to be a fine
balance somewhere in that process. Thank you.
PROF. CONE: We also have with us today Lloyd's Head of Strategy,
Nick Prettejohn. I am very grateful to Nick who flew over yesterday from
London in order to be with us. He has to fly back to London this evening
and I think we should all be grateful that he has taken the time to come
here and talk to us about the implications of the reconstruction of Lloyd's
of London.2
MR. PRETTEJOHN: Thank you very much. It is a great pleasure to be
speaking at an institution that, as I saw from the "flyer" for today's event,
talks about the discipline of scholarship and entrepreneurship. You would
very rarely see those two words juxtaposed so favorably in my country.
Therefore, it is a great pleasure to come to a country where those two
words can be uttered in the same consistent breath. I am going to talk
about the new Lloyd's and the issues and challenges that we face from the
perspective, as Terry said, of my position as Head of Strategy. I have to
say I think strategy is one of those splendid words that has fallen into
severe misuse along with perhaps "Madonna," and I think perhaps after
last night's TV coverage, "landslide" (reference to President Clinton
winning the election).
The business plan that Lloyd's published in 1993 basically fell into
two parts, firstly, to manage the problems of the past and then secondly to
build the new Lloyd's. I will try to avoid the pitfalls that befell Samuel
Beckett in the first performance of his great play Waitingfor Godot. The

2. © Lloyd's 1996. The text of this address by Mr. Prettejohn on The Implications of
the Reconstruction of Lloyd's of London is the copyright of Lloyd's and is reproduced by
kind permission of Lloyd's. No part of this address may be copied or reproduced in any
material form, including installing in any media by electronic means, photocopying,
recording or otherwise or transmitted in any form by any means electronic, mechanical
or otherwise, without the written permission of the Secretary to the Council of Lloyd's,
One Lime Street, London EC3M 7HA, England.
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critics said afterwards that it was awful, it was boring, nothing happened,
twice. And so I hope these two parts will not fall into that same trap.
I will talk very briefly about managing the problems of the past and
spend most of my time talking about building the new Lloyd's. Our
Reconstruction and Renewal program was formulated in response to twin
problems of liabilities and litigation. Coming out of that successful
reconstruction, we have two things: a clean balance sheet and clear minds
for the future. In terms of the clean balance sheet, Ed Muhl has talked
about the establishment of Equitas. We believe Equitas to be a strong and
well-reserved company that will offer policyholders the benefits of expert
claims handling and a properly capitalized balance sheet. (I would like
incidentally to pay tribute to Ed Muhl and his department for their
ceaseless work over the period of our Reconstruction without which our
Reconstruction would not have happened. They have put in an enormous
amount of effort and we thank them very much indeed for that).
As a result of the Reconstruction we have a new Lloyd's market
which retains the historic expertise but is free of past liabilities and costs.
It has secure assets, and it is free from the cloud of litigation that so got
in the way of sensible commercial thinking. We have a strong ratio of net
assets to technical reserves, perhaps best understood as the margin for
reserving error, that compares very favorably with industry comparisons.
Before the Reconstruction, we had a very weak balance sheet indeed; now
we have one that can compete in a world where financial security and
strength is a paramount consideration to our clients and policyholders.
I will now talk about the industry environment in which Lloyd's
competes, and then about Lloyd's competitive assets against the demands
of that environment. Finally, I will pick one or two of the issues and
challenges that I think Lloyd's is going to face as we move forward. The
industry environment in which we compete is characterized by a number
of factors. First, there is increasing risk. I had the preconception when
I joined the insurance industry that insurance was a dull, boring industry
with no growth. My experiences at Lloyd's certainly took care of the dull
and boring concern, but the no growth preconception has also been
changed from my brief period in the industry.
The world is an
increasingly risky place, and that constitutes a fundamental engine for
growth.
Second, the industry is showing considerable signs of consolidation.
In the reinsurance industry, the top ten reinsurers now count for about half
of the world reinsurance business, and that is up from twenty five percent,
ten years ago. There has been a major period of consolidation in the
industry and it is still going on, driven in large part by the concerns about
balance sheets and security that I mentioned earlier. Third, as with many
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industries, technology is having a considerable impact. It is changing the
way insurance products get distributed as lines of communication between
client and insurer get shorter. It is also changing the role of intermediaries
and creating the potential to reduce cost throughout the insurance system.
However, in the short run, it creates a competing upward pressure on costs
because companies are forced to invest to take advantage of increased
technological capability.
Major corporations are
Fourth, customer needs are changing.
increasingly self-insuring and thinking about traditional insurance in
Therefore, insurers and reinsurers are having to
different ways.
re-evaluate the way they do business. Our strategy must reflect what our
customers are thinking, and their thinking is changing quite dramatically
in some areas. Finally, the whole nature of capital is changing: it is no
longer simply enough to provide the traditional insurance capital. One has
to be able to think about the alternative sources of insurance capital, for
instance, the alternative that can be provided by the capital markets.
In summary, the minds of the traditional players in the insurance
industry, whether they are brokers or underwriters, have to focus on what
value they are actually bringing. Are we simply providing capital to
bolster our client's balance sheets or are we really providing expertise?
That all adds up to a fundamental change; I am an optimist because I
believe that fundamental change brings considerable opportunities for those
who have the right capabilities.
My belief is, now that we are clear of the Reconstruction program,
Lloyd's has the set of competitive assets which, if we can address some of
the challenges that I will talk about later, can provide us with a unique
competitive proposition in the world insurance industry. Let me spend a
minute talking about the assets that I believe that Lloyd's can bring to this
intensely competitive arena. The first of those is underwriting talent. The
studies of the industry that we have seen, for instance, by McKinsey and
other knowledgeable commentators, all focus on the paramount importance
of underwriting capability. In other words, the ability to identify and price
profitable risks. I believe that the surviving Lloyd's market is in a good
position to deliver the underwriting talent that clients need. Having been
through the attrition caused by incompetence, complacency, and inadequate
management controls that were so well described by Ed Muli earlier, we
now have underwriters, who have acknowledged world expertise and a
very strong track record. This is true in areas like medical malpractice,
directors' and officers' liability, and catastrophe insurance or reinsurance,
as well as in the traditional marine insurance and aviation markets where
we are world leaders.
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This expertise has translated into a very powerful profit performance
for those underwriters who have survived the period of considerable
attrition and hideous losses of the late 1980s and early 1990s. This chart
shows the performance of the syndicates that survived into 1996 versus the
overall market (see appended chart entitled Lloyd's Profits/Losses1986-95.
Result after Personal Expenses/Gross Capacity ). The bar on the left
shows the performance of the surviving market and the bar on the right
shows the average for the market. You will see a significant period of
profitability during the nid to late 1980s, and again in 1993, 1994 and
1995. But look at the middle period when the market was making severe
losses, shared outside by the London market and indeed the global
industries. Our surviving businesses barely made a loss at all; that is the
ultimate testimony to the power of those businesses as we go forward.
The second competitive asset we have is in our broking network and
its loyalty around the globe. I will not pretend for a moment that the role
of the Lloyd's broker does not have to change. The whole broking industry
is going through a period of fundamental change, and the value that
traditionally has been added by intermediaries has been brought into
increasing question. They are having to redefine their business in the same
way as the underwriters. But nonetheless, the loyalty and strength of the
Lloyd's broking community is a major competitive asset.
We have a very strong and long-standing set of customer relationships,
and the value of those customer relationships cannot be understated. That,
I think, is ultimately what people mean when they talk about the strength
of the Lloyd's market. It is the ability to come back year after year,
talking to our clients, understanding their needs and doing business with
them. Many of the key clients and key customer relationships that we
have in the Lloyd's market are the result of decades of work and
relationships. There is no more powerful indication of that fact than the
ability of the Lloyd's market to retain premium income during the period
when our difficulties were probably the best publicized difficulties in the
world commercial arena, The fact is, Lloyd's has managed to hold on to
an extraordinary business through a period where it has been under intense
scrutiny, and indeed competitive attack. So I think the performance of the
Lloyd's market both in terms of the profitability of the survivors and the
retention of business bodes well for the future.
We also have a resilient capital base. Through the period of intense
losses that I have referred to, we have actually been able to maintain our
tevet of capital support. Further, if you took at the bottom three bars for
1994, 1995, and 1996, we have been able to attract a significant degree of
high quality corporate limited liability capital, both from financial
institutions and from trade investors. (See appended chart entitled Lloyd's
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Membership 1993-96 Gross Allocated Capacity Split by Type). I will
come back and talk a little bit more about that without treading on Chris
Milton's comments that he is going to make later on.
Finally, I think the magic ingredient that actually translates the
previous competitive assets into a really outstanding competitive
proposition is the structure and culture of Lloyd's. You have heard that
in some ways Lloyd's did not change from 1700 to 1990. Of course, there
were some dreadful consequences of that which we have spent the recent
period of time wrestling with. But there are also some advantages and
some merits. I think the fundamental one is the ability to organize
ourselves into small responsive commercial units. I have advised major
companies, I have worked in or with major companies, and as a venture
capitalist I have presided over the dismemberment of major companies.
I can tell you that the major companies of the world would strive very hard
and probably spend a lot of money on expensive consultants trying to
recreate many of the positive aspects of the Lloyd's culture.
One of the aspects of the Lloyd's culture that many major companies
have tried and failed to create is its small profit responsible teams where
there is both a direct link with the customer and between the underwriter
and the claims handling team. That is an extremely powerful asset, and
as I have said, is the one which transforms those other preceding assets
into something that is uniquely powerful.
So, we have an industry environment that is characterized by change.
I believe that change provides opportunity. I also believe that Lloyd's has
many of the assets that can create that opportunity and take advantage of
it. But there is absolutely no room for anything that remotely resembles
the sort of complacency that Ed Muhl talked about before.
There are a number of important issues that we need to address and
I will talk a little bit about those now. The first is our capital base. We
have sustained our capital base, we have cleaned up our balance sheet
through the creation of Equitas and the Reconstruction program and we
have introduced limited liability capital. Let me talk more about the issues
and the challenges that we face in terms of our capital base. What about
It has proved
the continued existence of our traditional capital?
remarkably resilient through the process of reconstruction and period of
losses, and that resilience has presented us with a dilemma because I
believe that there are powerful commercial arguments that mean that the
traditional form of capital (unlimited liability through the annual venture)
is going to have to change over the coming period. It is a very unusual
business that has to recreate its capital base each year. It is a very unusual
business that has to think about whether its capital structure will allow it
to invest in research and development in technology despite the fact that
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it is very profitable. So to me, the issue of traditional capital is going to
have to be tackled progressively over the coming period, in a way that is
fair and immediately transparent.
Second, we live in an insurance world which is characterized by an
increasing preoccupation with its security, and we need to do everything
that we can to make our chain of security and the security that we offer to
our policyholders as transparent and as strong as possible. We have to do
that in a way that rigorously measures risk, evaluates risk and then
controls the entities that can take that risk. We have a strong commitment
to a basic level of collective security. It is extremely important for
Lloyd's licensing position internationally and our commercial credibility
in retaining the absolute commitment of our policyholders. Anybody who
is insuring with Lloyd's has to get paid so we have to maintain our system
of collective security, not just by relying exclusively on mutualized assets
like our Central Fund, but by making sure that our whole chain of security
offers the highest quality of security to our policyholders.
Finally, we do have to address the issues that are raised by our
changing capital base. There are new agendas as trade investors invest in
Lloyd's underwriters, whether they are from Bermuda or from the U.S..
You can see from this chart (see appended chart entitled Change in
CorporateMembership), that there has been a profound change in the sort
of corporate capital that has been invested in the market. When we started
with the introduction of corporate capital it was "spread" vehicles who
were investing, but recent investment has been "dedicated" capital (capital
backing a particular syndicate or particular agency), and it is increasingly
coming from trade investors. I believe that the market can only be
improved by the influx of corporate capital and trade capital. The market
will be strengthened in terms of management control and discipline, that
will ensure we do not repeat the mistakes Ed Muhl described earlier.
I do not believe in the currently fashionable view that once Lloyd's
has been "bought up" by these trade investors, that will represent the end
of traditional entrepreneurism in the Lloyd's market as we know it. We
are only just seeing the beginning of an endless wave of transactions and
changes of ownership. Actually, I believe that out of the competitive
strengths of Lloyd's in the future will be a hothouse of investing activity,
and I believe that the introduction of trade capital in particular will
encourage younger underwriters and their teams to set up independent
businesses. So there are some major issues that we are going to have to
tackle with our capital base that actually get to, in many ways, the whole
identity of Lloyd's as a marketplace and an institution.
Now for another perhaps less glamorous issue: our cost base. When
we published our business plan in 1993, we said that Lloyd's had become
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an increasingly high cost market in which to do business. You can see
from this chart (see appended chart entitled Lloyd's Cost Base), by looking
at the escalation of the bottom section of each bar, which is the ongoing
cost of the market, that through the second half of the '90s we built up a
cost base which made us uncompetitive in the market. Now you also can
see from the rather gratifying decline in the bottom section of each bar that
we have taken some steps to reduce out ongoing cost base. But again, I
do not think that we can afford to be complacent. We need to take some
pretty radical steps to ensure that Lloyd's is a cost-competitive market in
which to operate.
I should say as an aside that I am not a fan of the argument that says
you have to be low cost in the insurance or reinsurance business to deliver
superior levels of profitability. I can discern absolutely no relationship
between low cost and high profitability in any analysis of profitability in
the insurance industry. But nonetheless, if you compare the cost of doing
business in Lloyd's with the cost across the international arena, whether
it in the U.S. insurance industry or in the U.K., Lloyd's has a high
expense ratio. We have to do something to reduce the level of cost that
we have in the marketplace.
While the market has itself been doing a pretty good job of reducing
the level of cost there is more to do. I have talked about the attrition in
a number of syndicates in the marketplace, there were about 400 in the
early 1990s and that figure has come down to between 150 and 160
syndicates at the moment. There has been a considerable weeding out of
poor performers and consolidation of superior performers. The average
capacity of syndicates has gone up significantly as a result, and for those
disciples of economies of scale the costs at a syndicate level are
gratifyingly down in percentage terms. Now, in the same way that there
is a question mark about the impact of the changing nature of our capital
base for the entrepreneurship and the culture of Lloyd's businesses, there
is also a question mark about the impact of that consolidation. There are
going to be big management challenges to make sure we preserve
entrepreneurship and the small team mentality, while at the same time
instilling the disciplines of management control.
Aside from cutting costs, there is also the small matter of growing the
business. I alluded earlier to the fact that we had not lost as much
business as you might have expected us to, through our recent period of
criticism, scrutiny, and difficulty. But equally I cannot pretend that we
have demonstrated the performance of a growing business. We need to do
many things to develop our business going forward, in terms of our
strategy for geography, products and distribution. Traditionally, we have
focused on U.S. and other North American markets, but now Europe and
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other markets around the world count for nearly a third of our premium
base. If you compare that with the world insurance market, you would see
that we are over-represented in our traditional markets and underrepresented elsewhere. We need to put a lot of creativity and effort into
thinking about the ways we can develop, particularly in the growing
markets in Asia. We also need to address the fact that our American
business has not been growing. Part of that is due to our weU-pubticized
difficulties, and extremely capable and aggressive competitors in the U.S.
and Bermuda who have taken business away from us.
As far as products are concerned, it may be something of a revelation
to some of you that Lloyd's is much more than a marine, aviation and
transport business or even a specialty reinsurance business. We are for
instance the largest-motor insurer collectively in the U.K.. Lloyd's is
about a lot more than some of the products for which it is best known, and
we need to think carefully about tailoring our business system within
Lloyd's so that each of those types of business can grow profitably.
Further we need to think more widely about the challenges produced by
some of the trends in the industry which I spoke about earlier, such as the
move from traditional insurance products to alternative insurance products
in response to changing client demand.
So there are some very
complicated issues there too.
In terms of distribution, it is quite obvious to me that as technology
changes, the role of the intermediary will change as clients look for
different added value both from their brokers and from their insurers. We
are going to have to think very creatively about how we can maintain our
very strong partnership and relationship with our broking network, but at
the same time move forward to address changing client needs in the future.
There is also a question about regulation. We are thinking about
regulation in a review of our regulatory system over the next six months
which we announced recently. We need to think very carefully about the
different functions of regulation as they have been exercised by Lloyd's
historically. There are the functions of policyholder protection which are
the ultimate preserve of prudential regulators like the DTI and the New
York Insurance Department.
But there are also issues concerning investor protection which have
been a major focus for the Lloyd's regulators over the past years, and will
continue to be as we make the difficult transition in our capital base.
Further, there is a set of, if you like, "commercial rules of the club"
which actually defines Lloyd's and makes Lloyd's a rigorously defined
commercial proposition, These rules encompass levels of security,
management standards, and the levels of control that we need in order to
define Lloyd's as an excellent place in which insurance business is
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conducted. It seems to me that whenever we talk about regulation we need
to think about all these functions rather than thinking about regulation as
one set of activities.
Then there are the issues about technology. There is a considerable
pace of change in this area. The challenges for the insurance business in
general, and for Lloyd's in particular, is to keep up with that pace of
change in a way that is not too stop-and-start. We need to embrace
technological solutions that allow flexibility rather than be misguided in
attempting to come up with solutions that are designed to be there for all
time. The latter seems to me to be a misguided and expensive objective.
Finally, we have done a lot to improve the level of professional
standards in our market, consistent with the objective in our Business Plan.
We have been employing more graduates. We now have individual
accreditation for underwriters and participants in the market. We have
done a lot to encourage and force a raising of professional standards, but
there is a lot more that we need to do. At the same time we need to create
the mechanisms to regenerate the underwriting talent which is the thing
that makes
a unique place to do business.
So to Lloyd's
conclude, I think we have an industry environment that is
characterized by great change. We have in Lloyd's a set of competitive
assets that can allow us to take advantage of that period of change. But I
will not pretend that we do not have some significant issues and some
significant challenges to address before we can confidently say that we can
take advantage of those competitive assets I have listed. I think we have
achieved a great deal in the past. Clearly we have achieved the
Reconstruction. But I think almost unnoticed while the Reconstruction has
been going on, the Lloyd's market has transformed itself from an
institution that did not know the difference between 1700 and 1990, into
a modem, professional, rigorous and competitive marketplace. I think we
do have some significant challenges to address. I am confident that we can
address them and have the commitment to do so. And as a result of that,
I believe we have a uniquely competitive proposition to offer in the world
insurance and reinsurance market. Thank you.
SPEAKER: I am going to take advantage of your position as Head of
Strategy to ask what might be a question that is impossible for you to
answer. There are several things that you said and that came through in
your projections that raise a question for me. How does Lloyd's intend to
pursue and maintain its excess of loss reinsurance, which from your pie
chart is the largest segment of its business at seventeen point eight percent?
The capital markets have been looking for ways to provide alternatives to
traditional reinsurance to insurer, such as catastrophe bonds, for example.
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That is a direct threat, it seems, to any reinsurer that has a substantial
excessive loss segment of its business. You also mentioned the difficulties
associated with funding research and development at Lloyd's. Given the
challenges and the problems with coming up with money to find solutions,
assuming money is the answer, as Head of Strategy, what do you see
happening in the next five to ten years to address that problem?
MR. PRETTEJOHN: I think you have raised a fundamental issue for the
industry, not just for Lloyd's. Better brains than I have spent a lot of time
in discussing this issue in the recent past. I do not see the capital markets
supplanting the role of traditional reinsurance, I see ultimately the role as
a complementary one. I do think it will mean that there is a greater focus
on what value the reinsurance program is bringing. I think as far as
Lloyd's is concerned, the one thing that you cannot accuse Lloyd's
underwriters of is an inability to think creatively about how to meet
competitive demands. And talking to the excess of loss underwriters, they
are alive to this issue. They are certainly not squeamish about the notion
of moving away from their traditional role as providers of financial
capacity and towards a more advisory role-if that is the right way for
them to go and if they can make money by doing that. But I think we
have actually a long way to go before anybody will know the answer to
whether financial products are going to supplant traditional reinsurance
products. I hope that we actually have a role to play in shaping some of
that answer to that, rather than simply being victims of a trend.
MR. SUNG: My name is Chan Moon Sung, member of the class of 1993
from this school. The question I have is a general one pertaining to
Lloyd's, specifically in strategy, in developing a new market in the newly
developing countries of southeast Asia and Asia. Although many other
countries are closed, it seems inevitable that these markets will be opening
in the future. How do you foresee Lloyd's role in that?
MR. PRETTEJOHN: They are certainly some of the markets in which
Lloyd's is underrepresented. I do not know how you would classify the
Japanese market in relation to some of those more rapidly developing
markets, but there for instance, in response to the deregulation of that
market, we are setting up a business in Japan, to have a direct license in
Japan. That is a model we may seek to replicate across different parts of
southeast Asia and elsewhere, but there may well be other ways in which
we need to develop our presence. Each individual market obviously has
its own regulatory environment, and that clearly is the starting point for
thinking about any entry or development strategy. Certainly, judging from
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the prolonged absences that some of the underwriters I know have had
from London recently, most of them seem to be on trips to southeast Asia.
So there is a considerable degree of development activity going on.
The starting point is to successfully develop the relationships and trust
with the local intermediaries and local companies to enable a credible
business base to be developed. But it is a very important area for us going
forward. Very important indeed.
SPEAKER: This is a follow-up question to the question asked of the
superintendent. Can you say how the reserves for Equitas were established
and whether or not they were reviewed by anybody outside, and whether
there is any truth to something that was circulating a few months ago that
if you added up all the reinsurance recoverable in the United States that far
exceeded the reserves being set up in Equitas?
MR. PRETTEJOHN: The latter part of your question is not something
that I would want to get into in this forum, but I was intimately involved
in the reserving exercise for Equitas, so I can talk to you about the process
that we went through. Essentially, we divided the liabilities that were
faced by Equitas into a number of different categories. About half of the
balance sheet is accounted for by asbestos, pollution and health hazard
liabilities. There we did extensive exposure-based analyses of those
liabilities, looking, if you like, from the bottom up, looking at reinsurance
programs, assessing the likelihood of legal judgments and so on and so
forth, in order to come up with a bottom-up evaluation of those liabilities.
I certainly believe that the work that we did there was state-of-the-art
evaluation of that type of liability. I think it was Malthus who described
economics as the dismal science. I have to say after my experience with
the health hazard evaluation that actuarial science is more worthy of the
description. We evaluated an almost endless number of different potential
health hazards that might create liability for the Lloyd's market.
We then looked at the rest of the balance sheet and we again
subdivided the rest of the balance sheet into a number of different areas.
We looked separately at major catastrophe liabilities, for instance, those
associated with Piper Alpha. We also had a separate project looking at
some issues associated with professional indemnity. And then as far as the
remaining liabilities were concerned, we subjected those liabilities to the
most extensive actuarial review in the history of the Lloyd's market, with
over 200 individual syndicate level reports assessing about three-quarters
of the remaining liabilities by independent firms of actuaries. I have no
qualms about standing up here and saying we went through a thorough and
proper exercise. It was an exercise that Ed Muhl's team was involved in
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and was shown the results of. They had every opportunity to ask questions
about any angle they cared to. It was a process that our U.K. Department
of Trade and Industry sat through; they even had a room in the building
where they had access to documentation throughout the process. So I
believe we went through a thorough and proper reserving exercise,
scrutinized by others that resulted in a company that has a well-reserved
balance sheet.
SPEAKER: You mentioned at the beginning the goal of added efficiency
to claims handling to come through Equitas. I wonder if you can comment
where you see the successes in that and particularly comment on the fact
that a high percentage of the claims are a number of years old and they
have already been handled to a great extent in the past, and are changes
really being made in the way that claims that initially came in ten years
ago are is now being handled?
MR. PRETTEJOHN: The CEO of Equitas, would be better placed to talk
about that than I am, but I suppose the primary feature of the establishment
of Equitas from a claims-handling standpoint is the creation of centers of
excellence and those particularly dealing with asbestos and pollution and
health hazard claims. The idea that those sort of claims, which present
huge technical difficulties, could be handled in a commercially sensible and
responsible way by a fragmented collection of over 700 businesses was, I
think, a little difficult to imagine. So the creation of centers of excellence
to think about those claims and to deal with them in a consistent and expert
way seems to me a good thing from the every standpoint, not least that of
the policyholder.
MR. CONE: When this symposium was in the planning stage, it seemed
to me that we should have a speaker who could put these problems into a
social context if we can call it that or political context or overall economic
context; some general context, and .1was talking with Superintendent Ed
Muhl about this and he said, "Well, I have just the man for you." He said,
"His name is Sean Mooney." Sean very graciously saw me in his office
and we talked about this, and now he is here with us and so he will be
talking principally about mass torts but about other things, as well. I am
delighted that the Superintendent made the suggestion and at least equally
delighted that Sean agreed to follow up and be with us.
DR. MOONEY: Thank you, Terry. I am very pleased to be here. The
topic under discussion is mass torts. We are talking about substances that
cause injuries to people. By mass we mean causing injuries to large
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groups of people, such as, asbestos, Agent Orange, lead paint, silicon
breast implants. Why are we talking about this in the context of Lloyd's?
Well, in the United States if you look at estimates of insured losses from
asbestos, the latest figures from A.M. Best last year put insured losses
from asbestos at $40 billion, $16 billion of which has been paid, and $24
billion is yet to be paid. One-third is to come from reinsurance and that
is about $13 billion. And of course, a large percentage of reinsurance
payments come from Lloyd's. So obviously mass torts are of very great
importance to Lloyd's in its recovery.
I am not going to deal with Superfund; it is another major area of
mass torts, but Superfund basically deals with physical damage, not with
bodily injury. There was a study group, 301E, that was set up under the
Superfund Legislation in 1980 to look at the bodily injury side. They
made a report in July of 1982 and recommended a system of recovery,
part of which would be compensation system, the other part would call for
recovery in state courts. That report really never went anywhere because
there were so many problems on the cleanup side, the physical damage
side of Superfund, that I do not think anybody really wanted to enter into
the bodily injury side.
From the insurance perspective there are two major messages from
our experience with mass torts. There should be clearer language in terms
of definitions of occurrence and pollution. There is also the issue that we
need better underwriting. This is a difficult issue. In hindsight, one can
ask what should have happened, say, with asbestos? Companies did insure
a lot of the Johns Manvilles of this world for asbestos. Did they not know
that there was a danger out there? When you look at the record it is
difficult to know what was going on. Of course, there has been much
litigation about what was going on, but you definitely knew that asbestos
was a dangerous product. Mr. Johns of Johns-Manvilles died in 1898.
When they did an autopsy on his lungs, they said he died from dust on his
lungs. So that would give you some indication that a person dealing with
asbestos products faced a health hazard. Also, the manufacturers of
asbestos did know that there was a problem for the workers in the asbestos
factories. In fact, they had gone so far as to have plenty of precautions for
The
the workers, including masks for workers in the factories.
manufacturers also moved to have asbestos related diseases covered under
workers' compensation statutes. The manufacturers did not want to be
sued in tort by their own workers. They decided to have diseases that
caused asbestos covered under the workers' compensation system, where
the levels of compensation are not as high as they are in the tort system.
So I am not sure what lessons you can draw from the asbestos experience
in terms of underwriting. It appears that there was enough information to
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make companies wary of insuring asbestos manufacturers. Yet, they did
insure them. Insurance companies today are a lot more careful about
insuring products when they believe there is a danger of prolonged disease.
As a society, how have we dealt with mass torts, with areas of mass
injury? I think there is been three basic approaches. One is what I would
call the safety net or the unknown risk, or ignorance is bliss approach.
Many people die of different diseases every year. There are 450,000
cancer deaths a year. Many people get heart diseases, pneumonia and so
on. We do not know what causes all of these diseases, but we treat the
people within the social net. This net includes their own health insurance,
and
compensation system, disability benefits,
the workers'
Medicare/Medicaid.
The second system that we have used in these areas is the tort system.
If someone can prove legally that the disease resulted from a product and
that the product was unreasonably dangerous or that there were not
sufficient warnings on the product, that person may recover in the tort
system.
The main complaints about the tort system are that it is duplicative and that in many cases people are recovering from their own health
insurance and that the transaction costs are very high. When you add in
the legal costs of the plaintiff's lawyer and the defense, plus all the expert
witnesses and other court expenses, you are talking about over 50 percent
of the dollars not going to the plaintiff. It is being used up in transaction
costs.

The tort system leads to insurance availability problems, which in turn
leads to economic problems. Because insurers are scared away from
products that have the potential to cause disease, they are not going to
insure those products. So frequently those products may not be produced,
and that is an economic loss to society.
You also have inequities in the system. If you were filing suit, it is
better to be in Alabama or South Texas than to be in Maine or somewhere
else where there is a lot less litigiousness.
The third system that has been used to deal with many injuries - and
I know it might have seemed natural in the 1980s, when you look at all the
major problems that were caused in the tort system - is the compensation
system. In the 1980s it was believed that if you move to a compensation
system you would eliminate the transaction costs associated with tort. You
would also have the belief that you were "solving the problem." If there
were a group of people that were injured, we could marshal the resources
and get compensation to the injured. It would be all very straightforward
and very simple.
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In general, our experience with compensation systems is that they have
not worked very well. The main reason that they have not worked very
well is because there has been an expansion eligibility. There are three
elements of the compensation system. Who is eligible for the system?
What are the benefit levels when the people are injured? Also, where does
the money come from? Where is the funding? The usual problem with
the compensation system is eligibility; eligibility gets expanded for a
number of different factors, and the system explodes. The funding is not
sufficient to cover the resources that are needed because of the expansion
in eligibility.
I think one of the simplest ways to review the issue is to consider
what happened with one major compensation system, black lung. Black
lung is known as coal miner's pneumoconiosis. This condition basically
means that you have a scarring of the lung occurring because the person
is inhaling the coal dust. It was recognized at least as far back as 1822
when it was referred to in the literature as miner's asthma. In the United
States it began to be recognized as a serious problem in the 1960s. There
are two forms of it. There is the simple form where somebody has a little
scarring of the lung, not much trouble breathing and really no major
symptoms. And then the complicated form, where they have lot of trouble
breathing and ultimately can die of the disease from either heart failure or
some other disease, pneumonia, that is caused by the disease. There was
major concern about this in the 1960s, so a special program was put in
place by the Federal Government in 1969 under the Coal Mining Health
Safety Act. For eligibility under the 1969 act you had to be employed for
ten years in a coal mine. In addition, you had to show just on an X-ray
that you had the lesions caused by the coal dust. If you could prove those
two parts, you were eligible for the benefits. The benefits basically were
about fifty percent of the total disability benefit that a federal employee at
the GS2 level would receive. Then if you had dependents, the
compensation was increased.
The initial cost of the system over its entire life was estimated at a
total of $2.7 billion dollars. That is what they estimated it would cost the
Federal Government to run the whole system. By 1985 the system had
already cost $16 billion dollars a year and was running at a cost of a
billion dollars a year. What happened? It is a long story, but basically the
eligibility was expanded in 1972 and in 1977 and the increasing eligibility
led to increasing payments. That is how the system exploded. In 1981 they
moved to curtail the system, and now it is beginning to tail off. The mines
are a lot safer on the East Coast and there is more surface mining on the
West Coast, where you do not have as much exposure to coal dust.
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So as we look at those three different systems, first of all, let us take
the viewpoint of insured of insurance companies. What system would
insurers prefer for mass torts? I would argue that in general we have seen
a bias in insurers towards the social net system. If people are injured, they
should be covered by first-party insurance, by their own health insurance,
by workers' compensation, and so on. There is a little bit of sympathy
among insurers for the tort system but a general bias against compensation
systems. The general bias against the compensation systems is because we
have had the experience with systems like black lung. The major problems
are the expansion of eligibility and the expansion of benefits, which are
driven by political forces. There are two factors which cause this result.
One, you are talking about the special interest group, the injured parties.
This group can get organized and no counter group is organized on the
other side. The special interest group is typically seeking compensation
from federal government revenues or from insurance companies, so the
costs are borne by the general public, rather than a specific interest group.
Also, in an era of budget deficits, politicians like to look to regulation
So compensation systems where insurance
to redistribute income.
companies, employers and so on are the funding level, become very
attractive to politicians. That is why there is a general bias in the
insurance business against the compensation approach. Well, you would
say, why do we not favor a compensation approach, at least over a tort
solution? After all, the insurance industry argued for no-fault systems,
first-party systems, like no-fault auto insurance or like workers'
compensation. Why do we not argue for some kind of first-party system,
non-litigious system in this area?
Many insurers are less fearful of the tort system than they were in the
1970s and 1980s. Many of the problems that we have had in toxic torts
happened because of decisions by the courts.
We have had some bad science from our courts. Lots of junk science
winds up in the courts. However, in recent years we are seeing better
judgment on the part of judges in term of scientific knowledge. A recent
study concluded, as of now, there is no evidence of danger from
electromagnetic fields. Increasingly, if we get that kind of science in the
courts, we will do a lot better in terms of the tort system. Also the
industry can look for better results in terms of judicial education. In terms
of junk science, the Supreme Court decision in Daubert vs. Merrill Dow
PharmaceuticalsInc., did change the rules of evidence and said that the
judges should be making the decisions on what is admissible and not
admissible.
Also, when you look at compensation systems, you do not find that
they are without litigation. In fact, many compensation systems are
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overrun with litigation. For instance, with the black lung disease, the
black lung program itself had much litigation in terms of just the
administration of the system itself. It also had a lot of litigation associated
with who was eligible and how could you prove you were eligible. So we
do not necessarily get away from litigation when you go through a
compensation system.
So if our bias is against compensation and torts, is the social safety net
solution to these areas of injury, combined to some extent with the tort
system, good public policy? From a public policy point of view, how
would we as a society want to deal in mass injuries?
I think our major concern would be that sick people are taken care of.
If they have cancers or if they have a heart disease, society wants them to
be properly treated. And that would suggest that we should stay in the
social safety net, and if anything, we should expand the social safety net
so that it covers everybody in the system. We would also want, from a
public policy viewpoint, that where egregious wrongdoing has occurred,
it is punished by the full force of the law. And you probably would also
want to keep the tort system to punish egregious wrongdoing. So actually
you see the convergence of public policy viewpoint and the insurance
viewpoint in that area. So bottom line, I would say the insurer's interest
in the bias and preference towards social safety net, plus the proper use of
the tort system is also in line with sound public policy. Thank you.
PROF. CONE: We now are privileged to have as our speaker Christian
Milton, AIG. He is here to talk about corporate capital in Lloyd's. I am
delighted that he has taken the time because he is an extremely busy man
as Vice-President of Insurance at AIG.
MR. MILTON: Thank you, Terry. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.
AIG has obviously been very keyed to what is been happening in Lloyd's.
They are both our competitor and our reinsurer. I do not think anybody
here today has stated the sort of praise that should deservedly go to David
Rowland, Chairman of Lloyd's, who has worked extremely hard with
regulators in numerous different markets, clients, underwriters, and
actuarial departments, all with a view to restructuring and creating the
business environment that will allow Lloyd's to continue trading in the
future. As you know, on September 4, 1996, the approval of R&R went
through with the Department of Trade approving Equitas.
There are many questions vis-A-vis Equitas in terms of can Equitas
fulfill its purpose? In fact, in the short term, it is estimated twenty to
thirty percent of its actual value will decrease and that should be natural
in many respects. I can tell you as a reinsured, many things within the
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Lloyd's marketplace, particularly on tort liabilities, such as asbestos, and
on environmental liabilities have been held up because of the amount of
time and attention paid to Equitas and its set-up. Until that was completed,
other things were left on the back burner. Now, however, we have begun
see claim settlements moving at a speed for which we are gratified. O
the last two, I have been asked by two different sets of management
consultants about what I think Lloyd's should do. I am not sure how
these management consultants got to me, but from their questions I quickly
understood that they had both been employed by Lloyd's to find out how
Lloyd's could service its clientele more effectively. On the catastrophe
side of the house, Lloyd's has always been a very prompt payer of its
claims.
In fact, with Hurricanes Hugo and Andrew and with the
Northridge Quake, it not only paid its claims, but it paid them within seven
days.
The same cannot be said for Lloyd's casualty claims. This is
particularly true in cases involving complex tort claims that have occurred
within the United States. A number of different law firms representing
Lloyd's argued about what was covered and what was not covered. The
policy wording was not exactly the best written policy wording and
therefore it could have been interpreted in a number of different ways.
This problem coupled with the reinsurance wording superimposed on the
original coverage made it an even more difficult task. Furthermore, the
segmentation of the London market made the task nearly impossible in
terms of trying to reach an agreement in a timely and efficient manner.
What we have seen in Equitas is that Lloyds now has a central body
of claims expertise and experts. Many of them are out of individual
companies and/or syndicates in the London market base. We know them
well and we know their biases and prejudices. We know who they like
and who they dislike. But at the same time we know who they are, and
they are a very unique body of individuals. In fact, I was reminded by
Dean Wellington at lunch today that part of the asbestos problem in the
United states (reinsurance and insurance) was the Wellington Agreement
which was developed by some of these same individuals. The Wellington
Agreement addressed many asbestos settlement questions and did a lot to
get at least some settlements to claimants who were certainly in need of
reimbursement in some shape or form.
Equitas should fulfill its purpose at least for a number of years. If
anybody were to say that it is going to run short of funds or that it is going
to be overfunded, we believe that this it is too early to call at this point in
time. I am sure that the New York State Insurance Commissioner did
whatever he felt was appropriate to protect the policyholders' interest
within the United States and to ensure that they get full impact as far as
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that is concerned. We have no doubts after having dinner the other night
with the Chairman of Swiss Re North America, who was the actuary
concerned in doing most of those calculations, and a lady of the highest
integrity, who I would not like to second-guess on any dealings. I do a lot
of business with Heidi Hunter, a very remarkable lady.
We have no doubt that Lloyd's is evolving its capital structure with its
decision to introduce corporate capital, which really started as part of its
business plan back in 1993. Now, we just have to distinguish the Names
from the corporate capital. We should expect to see the diminishing role
of the Names, which we believe is going to happen more and more, with
an ever increasing role for corporate capital. But we have to be careful
with corporate capital. If we were to look at the press over the last couple
of weeks, corporate capital according to recent Lloyd's numbers represents
only about thirty percent of the total capital.
What is more interesting is the agencies that are actually owned by
corporate capital and the infrastructure through which they have evolved.
These are the takeovers of Lloyd's member agencies which took place
during the 1990s. Ace took over what used to be known as the Okham
Agency, previously known as the Sturge Agency as well as the Methuen
Agency. Aon strategic partners have taken over a number of syndicates.
Chartwell has just taken over Archer and this week, Mid-Ocean in addition
to its purchase of Brockbank, purchased another Lloyds agency. Terra
Nova took control of Octavian and the Trident Partnership secured the
agency run by Venton. As well a couple of other syndicates are setting
up.
When I was in London a week or so ago, the information in Lloyd's
was that there is an estimated forty new capital syndicates scheduled to be
set up for 1997. The number is actually overstated and it is probably
about half of that. This will actually increase the number of syndicates
from about 167 to close to 200. But the average stamp capacity is
estimated to be thirty million pounds. That adds another billion-pound
stamp capacity to the Lloyd's writing. That is where it is right now as far
as stamp capacity averages per syndicate. Interestingly, for a number of
years we felt that the average individual syndicate with its stamp capacity
was too small. Therefore, we believed that the average individual
syndicate was unable to invest money into its own infrastructure.
Furthermore, we believed that the need to create larger capital vehicles
was an absolute necessity for Lloyd's to continue in the future.
The future for Lloyd's is always changing. It changes insofar as
syndicates going forward. If we look at the mega-syndicates, the ability
to write mega amounts in risk in today's environment is an absolute
necessity. Marsh & McClennan announced, on behalf of Lloyd's, a new
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Political Risk Lineslip written in the marketplace which will take up to
$250 million dollars in new markets for confiscation, expropriation and
nationalization risks. AIG will probably only have about $120 million
since Lloyd's competes very heavily where its capital is concerned.
The other part of Lloyd's that required more capital and more
continuous capital is its capital base. In fact, Lloyd's recreates its capital
base every year. This gives the market a tremendous amount of (a)
volatility and (b) lack of continuity as far as Llody's insurance clients are
concerned. It is very frustrating when as a client in Lloyd's, and I have
placed most of my business in Lloyd's for several years, I go to renew a
set of contracts, and Lloyd's underwriters say, "Well, Chris, it is like this,
I am not too sure that I have got the stamp capacity for next year. In fact,
I am not too sure I am going to be in business next year at this point in
time." I have a continuing history of profit with that particular syndicate
and yet, the renewal and everything have been built up over the years,
goes down in one easy swoop. It happened in 1985, it happened in 1996,
and certainly our program has seen the loss of a number of syndicates.
We used to place seventy percent of our catastrophe covers within the
Lloyd's marketplace, but today that percentage has dropped to thirty
percent. We have not taken business away from Lloyd's. What actually
happened was as a result of Lloyd's lack of continuity and capital base.
It has been replaced by Bermuda capacity and it has been replaced by other
American capacities. It is this loss of a business trading relationship that
basically Lloyd's has to get back.
Another problem is that Lloyd's in the past, has over traded. Because
of the small capital bases per syndicate and because of the need to
demonstrate underwriting at an operating profit, Lloyd's underwriters have
bought reinsurance at levels which quite frankly in today's age makes no
sense. Several years ago our former reinsurance department wrote what
was traditionally known as London Market Excess of Loss Business. We
insured syndicates in excess of $250,000. In today's mindset, you have to
really wonder about the quality of security. Capital and the quality of
security is paramount. In fact, I know that in the Equitas project, a lot of
security was eliminated, in terms of what was going to be necessary to
support the future situation of Lloyd's.
The other thing that has really concerned us is the link between
Equitas, the funds of Lloyd's, and Lloyd's security chain. In fact, we
actually spoke to about ten people from Lloyd's about this issue because
we felt that they could know what they are talking about. The central fund
of Lloyd's actually still exists, but a substantial amount of it actually has
been used by Lloyd's to fund Equitas. It is not as large as it used to be,
and actually it does not need to be as large as it used to be. Part of the
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reason that it does not need to be as large as it used to be is essentially
because the liabilities representing nearly 100 years of runoff are now
separated out from the old Lloyd's system. I think the average point in
time right now is that all members will contribute to the fund, corporate
members will contribute at a rate that is two and a half times that of an
individual member. And that is partly because they have limited liability.
All this forms part of the concerns that we have.
I should not even say concerns. Part of the issue that revolves around
Lloyd's and its changed capital is how we get to give it a credit rating and
how we measure that from a security standpoint? I know that Ed Muhi
has significant issues with the role of credit agencies like S&P and A.M.
Best. In this day and age, one of the things that we have to do for the
New York State Insurance Department is to give them actuarial assessment
of what we think our reinsurance looks like and what our creditworthiness
looks like at some point in time. In some respects we use the S&P and the
A.M. Best credit agents to do that. We cannot do that with Lloyd's.
Partly what we need to be able to see over an extended period of time is
how its security funds look and how its overall statements work towards
giving us financial assessment and transparency. I am suggesting this idea
to a number of syndicates. We need them to start thinking about seriously
producing the equivalent of the United States Convention Statement given
the amount of business that they have within the United States so that we
can measure them on the same basis as we measure American companies.
The other part of this chain of security that causes me some concern
is that with the introduction of corporate capital into Lloyd's, I have to
deal with both a reinsurance buyer and with risk management within AIG
in terms of understanding risk, financing risk, and reinsuring corporate
vehicles into other related companies. One of the things that worried me
to some extent is that reinsurance is really an indirect form of financing a
company. You can, in fact, transfer money from one place to another.
What has to be addressed is the regulations that deal with the questions
raised, such as, if Ace Limited were to own a syndicate of Lloyd's and
provided it with corporate capital, is it moving money from one vehicle to
another vehicle? What regulations are in place to ensure that there is at
least some oversight responsibility? The same is true with any company,
with the exception of limit, everybody else is an insurance company. They
can move money around. We do not want to be facing the same problem
ten years down the road. It is one of the major issues that we think needs
to be addressed from the Lloyd's system. In fact, unfortunately, I have to
file a request with the insurance department every time I want to do piece
of reinsurance for a related company. I do not see that within the Lloyd's
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system at this point in time. This is an issue which perhaps our Lloyd's
representative would like to address.
AIG has some conclusions as far as where Lloyd's is heading and
what corporate capital is going to do for it. First, we think that the
corporate membership's impact on Lloyd's future is that it will eventually
eliminate the unlimited Names. In that respect we think that will be a
great toss, but we think that is going to be a move that eventually will go
forth. There will be fewer but even larger syndicates, and in fact they are
going to become much more like insurance companies as opposed to
syndicates as we have known them in the past. Certainly there will be a
more permanent, less volatile capital base, which will allow Lloyd's to
grow and also to diminish their conflicts of interest. Second, one of the
real problems Lloyd's has had in the past is that the person who has been
managing the business (the managing general agent), and the person who
has been providing the capital resources for it to write that business, have
not been the same person. With the advent of corporate capital, basically
corporate capital buying the underwriting agency and having control of the
underwriter, you now have a different set of interests where economic
processes are combined at that point in time.
If you go back and look at some of the issues of over-trading in terms
of under reserving and profit commission statements, a tremendous amount
of this activity is very similar to what we have in the United States. For
instance, in the United States, managing general agents are commissionorientated while having the reserving capability, and therefore they are
able to calculate their enumeration by virtue of remuneration. It is a
formula for fraud and I think the underwriting agency being owned by the
capital that is providing it makes a lot of sense. It means, you can fire the
underwriter, and you can do things you would not be able to do ordinarily.
We think more discipline and less tolerance for poor results have certainly
resulted in some rather interesting results. For example, a Lloyd's
underwriter said to me, "This corporate capital stuff, are really benign
investors when all is said and done." I said, "They are only benign while
the rate of return is positive. Wait until it's negative and you'll find out
how benign they are then." I thought that was a very naive comment that
he made at that point in time.
Third, we think at the same time as Lloyd's regenerates itself with
larger capital bases, there may in fact be a redundancy of a need for the
central fund after all, particularly as the unlimited Name disappears from
the equation. Lastly, we think that there will be an end to self-regulation.
I think that is already on the table as far as there is already some pretty
serious discussion about a House of Parliament selectively being set up to
have oversight for Lloyd's transactions at this point in time. Thank you.
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SPEAKER: Why do you think that the elimination of unlimited liability
Names is going to be useful? Will it not have the effect of doing precisely
what you wanted, make it more transparent in terms of the credit rating of
the other side of the transaction and not have any ambiguity about that?
MR. MILTON: I think what is really going to happen is that the unlimited
Name is essentially going to incorporate itself as limited capital. I think
you will see that there is an advantage to it. Why take on an unlimited risk
when you can limit that risk by turning it into a corporate capital vehicle?
You do not need a lot on the Lloyd's system. On the Lloyd's system you
can create a corporate capital vehicle very inexpensively at this point in
time. Thank you.
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